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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ALFRED P. KATOA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 981699-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
it Jc ic 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of automobile 
homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (1995). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue on Appeal. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it sentenced 
defendant to two indeterminate prison terms of zero-to-five years, to be served consecutively, 
for his conviction on two counts of automobile homicide? 
Standard of Review. Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely 
within the discretion of the court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984); see 
also State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649,651 (Utah App. 1997). Therefore, the appellate court 
will not overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it finds an abuse of discretion. 
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Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651; State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). An 
abuse of discretion may be found if the sentencing is inherently unfair, is clearly excessive, 
or is imposed without considering all legally relevant factors. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
Nevertheless, the court "may find an abuse of discretion only if [it] conclude[s] that 'no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."' Id. (quoting State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions and statutes is 
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal: 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 9 (1991): 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; 
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1997): 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
* * * 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
* * * 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged by Information with five counts of manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995). R. 2-6. Pursuant to a plea 
bargain, the State filed an Amended Information charging defendant with two counts of 
automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) 
(1995), and defendant entered pleas of guilty to both counts. R. 27, 36-38. After receiving 
a Presentence Investigation Report1 (PSI) and hearing from defendant, defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, and family members of two victims, the court sentenced defendant to two 
consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years. R. 47-48, 76.2 Thereafter, defendant filed a 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence or in the Alternative Motion to Amend Judgment 
("Motion to Correct Sentence") asking that the trial court amend or alter the judgment to 
provide concurrent sentences.3 T. 51-53. The trial court denied the motion and defendant 
timely filed a notice of appeal. T. 58, 60. 
!The PSI prepared for defendant is attached in Addendum A. The PSI is located in 
a large manila envelope identified at page 75 in the index. Defendant's PSI will simply 
be cited as PSI followed by the page number (e.g., PSI at 3). Also in the manila 
envelope, R. 75, is the presentence investigation report prepared for the co-defendant, 
Aisea Akauola. Akauola's PSI will be cited herein as PSI-Akauola. 
2The sentencing transcript, which is reflected in the record at page 76, is attached 
in Addendum B and will be cited herein as "TOS," e.g., TOS at 23. 
3The Motion to Correct Sentence is attached in Addendum C. 
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Aisea Akauola ("Akauola"), a co-defendant in the case, was also charged with five 
counts of manslaughter. PSI-Akauola at 2. Like defendant, Akauola pled guilty to two 
counts of automobile homicide as charged in an amended information. Id. Akauola was also 
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of zero to five years. TOS at 24. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS4 
On July 24,1997, defendant and several others, including Aisea Akauola, participated 
in a rugby tournament at the Granger High School rugby field. PSI at 2, 4; PSI-Akauola at 
4. Following play that day, many from the group, including defendant and Akauola, 
remained at the park into the afternoon drinking beer and smoking marijuana. PSI at 2-4. 
At approximately three o'clock that afternoon, West Valley City police officers responded 
to the group's location on a reported DUI involving a black jeep. PSI at 2. The officers did 
not effect any arrests, but emptied several beer cans found at the site, notified the group that 
drinking was not allowed on the grounds, and requested that they leave. PSI at 2. 
Thereafter, defendant and five others left the park in a van to go to a friend's house. 
PSI at 2, 4. Defendant drove the van even though someone had asked him to move out of 
the driver's seat because of the level of his intoxication. PSI at 3. Defendant later admitted 
to authorities that he had smoked two marijuana "joints" and drank four beers while at the 
4Because neither a trial nor a preliminary hearing was held in this case, the facts 
cited in this brief are taken primarily from the Probable Cause Statement in the 
Information and the presentence investigation reports. 
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park.5 PSI at 3. Akauola apparently followed defendant in the black jeep.6 PSI at 4. As the 
vehicles traveled westbound on a residential street with a speed limit of 35 m.p.h., Akauola 
passed defendant and cut in front of him. R. 4; PSI at 4. Defendant then moved his vehicle 
left of center and proceeded to pass or race along side Akauola's jeep at a high rate of speed. 
R. 4; PSI at 2, 4. As the two vehicles sped down the residential street, they apparently 
brushed against each other. R. 4; PSI at 2. Defendant's van then collided with an oncoming 
automobile after which it careened into a parked, flatbed trailer.7 R. 4; PSI at 2. The jeep 
also collided with the trailer, coming to rest in the undercarriage of the trailer. R. 4; PSI at 
2. The two vehicles were later estimated to be traveling at speeds of 79 to 81 m.p.h. R. 4; 
PSI at 3. 
Five people were killed as a result of the accident: the two occupants in the eastbound 
automobile and three passengers in defendant's van. R. 4; PSI at 3. The remaining two 
passengers in the van were also transported to the hospital with injuries and were still 
5Blood samples taken from defendant later that day revealed a blood alcohol 
content of .02% and a metabolite for marijuana with nonquantitative results. PSI at 3. 
6Blood samples taken from Akauola later that day revealed a blood alcohol content 
of .11% and a metabolite for marijuana with nonquantitative results. PSI at 3. 
7Defendant reported to the investigating officer that the jeep hit the side of his van 
prior to the accident. PSI at 4. Akauola's version of events was somewhat different. He 
indicated that as he sped up when the van attempted to pass him, a car pulled out and the 
van ran into the car and then bounced into the jeep. PSI-Akauola at 4. The official 
version set forth in the PSI indicates that the jeep sped up and/or swerved into the van to 
prevent it from passing. PSI at 2. The Probable Cause Statement attached to the 
Information simply indicates that the vehicles brushed against each other and they lost 
control. R. 4. 
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recovering almost a year later.8 R. 4; PSI at 3, 6-7. Three occupants in the jeep, including 
Akauola, were also transported to the hospital with injuries. PSI at 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
prison terms. The record, however, clearly demonstrates otherwise. The sentence was 
reasonable in light of the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the sentencing judge duly 
considered the gravity and circumstances of the offense, together with the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of defendant. 
Defendant also contends that the consecutive prison terms violated the "unnecessary 
rigor" clause in article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. However, defendant failed to 
preserve below, and adequately argue on appeal, his claim that the consecutive sentences 
violated the provision. In any case, the unnecessary rigor clause applies to the treatment of 
prisoners and not to terms of incarceration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS 
FOR AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion 
of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant 
has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or 
8One of the survivors was in a coma for more than a month following the accident 
and his family reported that he is "not all with it" mentally and may never fully recover. 
R. 4; PSI at 6. 
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consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose 
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not 
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-401(4). 
Although the courts have opined that Utah's sentencing statute favors concurrent 
sentencing, see State v. Strunk, 846P.2d 1297,1301 (Utah 1993),9 an appellate court will not 
overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it is clear that the trial court abused its 
discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). As the supreme court in Gerrard observed, "[t]o do 
otherwise would have a chilling effect on the trial court which has the main responsibility 
for sentencing." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial 
court fails to consider the statutory factors or if the sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair 
or clearly excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. However, an "appellate court can properly 
find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887; Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
A review of the record in this case reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion 
in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years on each of the two 
9In so observing, the supreme court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) which 
provides: "Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the 
sentence that they shall run consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301. 
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counts to which he pleaded guilty. The consecutive sentences were reasonable and the trial 
court considered all statutory factors.. 
A. The Trial Court's Sentence Imposing Two Consecutive Prison Terms 
of Zero-to-Five Years for Automobile Homicide Which Resulted in 
Five Deaths Is Reasonable. 
Defendant was originally charged with five counts of manslaughter, a second degree 
felony, for his conduct on July 24,1997, which resulted in the deaths of five people. R. 2-6. 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty, not to five counts, but to only two counts 
of the reduced offense of automobile homicide, a third degree felony. R. 27, 36-38. 
Defendant was not required to answer charges for the deaths of three individuals. 
The gravity and circumstances of the offenses cannot be understated. The accident 
was so devastating that one officer reported that upon arrival, he thought dispatch had made 
a mistake reporting the incident as an automobile accident. PSI at 18. Based on the property 
damage and ''condition of the dead, dying, and injured," the officer believed he had arrived 
instead at the scene of a massive explosion. Id. Killed in the accident were the occupants 
in the eastbound automobile, Helene R. Sherlin and her husband, Robert Sherlin, and three 
passengers in defendant's van, Sione Pilivi, Selanito Sitani, and Amanaki Moala. R. 4; PSI 
at 3. Another passenger in the van, Lamu Tongamana, was in a coma for more than a month 
and is not expected to ever fully recover mentally. R. 4; PSI at 6. 
The trial court characterized, and perhaps understated, defendant's conduct as an 
"almost absolute and total disregard for the lives and the safety of other people." TOS at 23-
24. Defendant drove even though someone had asked him not to do so because he or she 
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believed defendant was impaired. PSI at 3. He attempted to pass his friend on the crowded, 
residential street at speeds of approximately 80 m.p.h., R. 4; PSI at 3, conduct which even 
a child would recognize as "suicide/' much less a veteran driver of presumably fourteen 
years.10 
Given defendant's willful conduct in operating the vehicle in the manner he chose, his 
disregard for the lives and safety of others, and the tragic consequences of defendant's willful 
acts, it cannot "be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Indeed, although not the test on appeal, the opposite can 
be said: all reasonable people would impose consecutive prison terms. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Considered All Legally Relevant Factors 
in Sentencing. 
As noted above, section 76-3-401 (4), Utah Code Ann., requires the court to "consider 
the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant." Failure to consider these factors can result in an abuse of discretion. 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. However, defendant concedes that "all the mitigating 
information'' was before the trial court. Aplt. Brf. at 9-10, n. 2. Accordingly, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve consecutive prison terms. 
10The supposition that defendant had driven for fourteen years is based on his age 
of thirty and the typical driving age of sixteen in most states, including California from 
where he moved. PSI at 1, 11-12; see Cal. Veh. Code § 12507 (Deering 1972) (repealed 
in 1997 by Stats. 1997, c. 760 (S.B. 1329), § 2) (similar substantive provisions now set 
forth in Cal. Veh. Code. § 12814.6 (Deering 1997)). 
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Defendant's underlying premise on appeal is that the court placed too much emphasis 
on the gravity and circumstances of the offense and not enough emphasis on other factors. 
Defendant essentially asks this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial courtr 
Such is not the duty of the Court. The statute requires only that the court consider these 
factors, not that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (4); see also State 
v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("Although a sentencing judge will give 
considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other 
factors."); State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating 
him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court," which endeavors to impose "a proper sentence based on the facts and 
law before it." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The record in this case reveals that the trial court 
did, in fact, duly consider all statutory factors and acted within its discretion in imposing the 
sentence. 
1. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Gravity and Circumstances 
of the Offense. 
As previously explained, supra, at 8-9, the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
cannot be understated. Unlike the case in State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), where 
the defendant "did not inflict any physical injuries on his victims," defendant inflicted the 
ultimate physical injury on his victims. Unlike the case in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1995), defendant did not just inflict severe injury on his victims, but caused their needless 
10 
deaths. Unlike the case in State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), defendant did not 
cause the death of one person, but caused the needless deaths of five people and forever 
changed the lives of their families. The lives of Helene Sherlin, Robert Sherlin, Sione Pilivi, 
Selanito Sitani, and Amanaki Moala were prematurely cut short by defendant's willful acts. 
The life of Lamu Tongamana was irreversibly changed. See PSI at 6 (he is not expected to 
ever fully recover mentally). Yet, had defendant acted with any ounce of foresight or 
common sense, had he acted in a manner that respected human life, no tragedy would have 
occurred. See PSI at 10 (wherein defendant states that he never would have acted the way 
he did had he known the outcome of that day). 
Defendant's Almost Absolute Disregard for Others. Although defendant did not 
intentionally kill the victims, he did, as the trial court found, act with an "almost absolute and 
total disregard for the lives and the safety of other people" resulting in the deaths of five 
people. TOS at 23-24. Given the conditions at the time, defendant's conduct was not simply 
an exercise of poor judgment as he now contends, but a wanton disregard for the lives of 
others. The level of defendant's culpability was perhaps best described by the eldest son of 
Robert and Helene Sherlin: 
What [defendant and Akauola] did is the equivalent of firing a loaded 
gun haphazardly into a crowd. Does the fact that the gunman did not take 
actual aim[] [mean that he] wasn't [] responsible] for his actions? No, the 
death of my parents was not an accident. Both of these men behaved in an 
extremely reckless and deadly fashion. Either one of them could have backed 
down and behaved in a rationale [sic] and civilized fashion. Neither did. 
TOS at 14, 15. 
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Defendant asserts that although he reminded the court at sentencing that he did not 
behave with any malice, the court failed to give any consideration to this fact when it 
imposed the sentence. Aplt. Brf. at 13. Defendant's claim is not supported by the record. 
The court first noted that defendant "is not as evil as some of the people" seen in court. TOS 
at 23. Moreover, the court's finding that defendant's conduct constituted an "almost absolute 
and total disregard for the lives and the safety of other people" was an implicit recognition 
that defendant did not act intentionally.11 
Defendant's argument appears to assume the legal proposition that the trial court 
abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive prison terms for crimes that are not committed 
intentionally or maliciously. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. Defendant cites to Strunk, Smith, and 
Galli, in which the supreme court vacated consecutive sentences for intentional crimes, as 
support for this proposition. Id. However, defendant's reliance on these decisions for such 
a proposition is misplaced. These decisions, which are discussed in greater detail infra, at 
21 -24, did not rest on or even discuss the culpable mental states of the accused. The fact that 
courts have vacated consecutive sentences for intentional crimes does not, a fortiori, prohibit 
consecutive sentences for crimes involving a lower culpable mental state. Moreover, had the 
1
 defendant indicates that he did not act with malice aforethought. However, the 
term malice aforethought was long ago abandoned with the adoption of the current 
criminal code. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 258 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, the 
supreme court in Standiford observed that "[s]ince the term 'malice aforethought' is a 
confusing carry-over from prior law and can lead to confusion, if not error, it should no 
longer be used." Id. at 258-59. As such, the State will address defendant's challenge in 
terms of the actor's mental state as defined under the current criminal code, e.g., 
"intentionally." 
12 
legislature intended to restrict the imposition of consecutive sentences in this manner, it 
could have expressly so provided in the language of the statute. 
The imposition of consecutive prison terms for automobile-related homicide is not 
unprecedented in Utah. InStatev. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136,1137 (Utah App. 1991),atruck 
driver's brakes failed as he was driving a large truck loaded with 78,000 pounds of steel 
down a grade. In an effort to stop the truck, the driver steered across the opposing lane of 
traffic toward a hillside. Id. As he did so, however, a car came around the bend and collided 
with the truck, killing all three occupants in the car. Id. At trial, the State established that 
the driver's brakes had not been adjusted in accordance with federal or state requirements. 
Id. The driver also conceded that the brakes had not been adjusted since he left Tennessee. 
Id. The driver was convicted of three counts of negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, 
and was sentenced to three consecutive one-year jail terms. Id. Without discussion, this 
Court upheld the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms as properly within its 
discretion. Id. at 1141. As the Court in Gambrell observed, other jurisdictions have also 
upheld consecutive sentences for automobile-related homicide involving multiple victims. 
Id. at 1140 & n. 4 (citing, among others, State v. Whitley, 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1964); State 
v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986)). 
Defendant's Impaired State. By his own admission, defendant had consumed four 
beers and smoked two marijuana joints at the park. PSI at 3. In fact, he was asked not to 
drive due to his intoxication. Id. Nevertheless, defendant disregarded the request and drove 
13 
anyway. Id. Defendant then proceeded to race down a crowded, residential street at speeds 
of approximately 80 m.p.h.12 Id.; R. 4. 
In his brief, defendant attempts to minimize the level of his intoxication, arguing that 
neither the marijuana nor the alcohol impaired his driving, and should not, therefore, have 
been treated as contributing factors to the accident. Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. Defendant claims 
that the trial court unduly focused on his alcohol and marijuana use, failing "to acknowledge 
related mitigating information that actually shows [defendant's] drinking and smoking to be 
rather limited." Id. at 13. Specifically, defendant contends that the court failed to recognize 
as mitigating factors the blood test results indicating a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .02 
and a marijuana metabolite with nonquantitative results. Defendant's claim in this regard is 
beyond reason. The presence of either substance in his system can hardly be considered a 
mitigating factor. 
In any case, that the court was fully aware of and considered these factors is apparent 
from the record. The PSI indicated that defendant's blood tests revealed a marijuana 
metabolite with nonquantitative results and a BAC of .02. PSI at 3. Moreover, defense 
counsel expressly brought to the court's attention at sentencing the fact that defendant had 
12Defendant claims that he was traveling 60 m.p.h., a speed "much lower" than that 
estimated by the police. Aplt. Brf. at 4. Defendant's contention that he was traveling 60 
m.p.h. is not supported by the record. Defendant's accident reconstructionist did not 
estimate the speed, but contended that due to certain factors, "a realistic calculation is 
impossible." PSI, attached letter from David G. Lord dated June 1, 1998. In any case, 
that the vehicles were traveling well in excess of the speed limit can hardly be questioned. 
One veteran officer who responded to the scene indicated that he had never seen an 
accident that equaled this accident in his twenty-four years on the force. PSI at 8. 
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a BAC of .02.. TOS at 4. That the court took into account defendant's relatively low BAC 
at sentencing is apparent from the court's comment that Akauola (who had a BAC of .11%) 
"had a much higher blood alcohol level than [defendant]." TOS at 11. 
Defendant also argues that he "was not legally drunk and was fit to drive" because he 
"had a [BAC] of only .02 at the time of the accident." Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. This contention 
is without merit, ignoring both the law and his own admissions before the court. A BAC of 
.08% is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not defendant was under the influence 
of alcohol. The automobile homicide statute to which defendant pleaded guilty requires a 
showing that defendant operated a motor vehicle either while having a BAC of at least .08% 
or while under the influence of alcohol and/or any drug to a degree that rendered him 
incapable of safely operating the vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1 )(a) (1995). 
Defendant's plea of guilty to automobile homicide is an admission of each element of the 
offense. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(a) (1998); James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 573 (Utah 
App. 1998) (observing that "a guilty plea is in effect an admission not only that the defendant 
did certain acts, but also that the defendant committed a certain crime"). Accordingly, 
because defendant's BAC was under .08%, his plea of guilty constitutes an admission that 
he operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree that 
rendered him incapable of safely operating the vehicle. Although defendant denied the effect 
of marijuana on his driving, defendant fully admitted in the Statement of Defendant that his 
"driving was impacted by the fact [he] was under the influence of alcohol." R. 28. Whether 
defendant's intoxication was from the alcohol, the marijuana, or a combination of the two, 
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is irrelevant. Given defendant's own admissions, the court's consideration in sentencing that 
defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana prior to the accident was expedient and 
well within its discretion. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's History. 
Defendant's Criminal History. Defendant also claims that the trial court misconstrued 
and put undue weight on his criminal history. Again, however, the record does not support 
this contention. Defendant equates this case with Galli, in which the supreme court vacated 
the consecutive sentences in part because Galli's criminal history included only minor traffic 
offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction. Aplt. Brf. at 15. As explained above, 
however, Galli is distinguishable from this case because Galli did not cause the deaths of 
anyone nor did he even injure anyone. The cases are also distinguishable because, contrary 
to defendant's contention, his criminal history is not as minor as it would have the court 
believe. Although the PSI did not report any felony convictions, it did indicate that 
defendant had been convicted for: (1) resisting arrest on two occasions, (2) misdemeanor 
battery or similar offenses on four occasions,13 one of which involved serious bodily injury, 
(3) vandalism, and (4) possession of a controlled substance. PSI at 9-10. These crimes, 
although misdemeanors, are not mere traffic offenses as was the case in Galli. 
Noting that none of defendant's prior crimes were for reckless driving or were 
otherwise alcohol-related offenses, defendant takes issue with the court's conclusion that his 
13One of the four convictions was identified as a misdemeanor conviction for 
inflicting corporal injury. PSI at 10. 
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prior conduct should have taught him better. Aplt. Brf. at 14-16. Although the reported 
convictions do not indicate a history of reckless driving, the statute does not limit the court's 
consideration to only those offenses which resemble the crime for which he is being 
sentenced. The trial court may properly consider the overall criminal history of defendant. 
See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 548 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that in light of the 
defendant's extensive criminal history, "the trial court did not err in failing to recognize 
defendant's lack of history of similar sex-related offenses as a mitigating factor"). Moreover, 
although the offenses for which he was convicted did not involve reckless driving, the 
battery-related offenses do demonstrate a general disregard for the life or well-being of 
others. This disregard resulted in five deaths on July 24, 1997.14 
Defendant's History of Substance Abuse. Defendant also claims that because he had 
never been convicted of an alcohol-related crime, the court committed reversible error when 
it stated that both defendant and Akauola "had been arrested, convicted and sentenced for 
drinking crimes and drug crimes." TOS at 24. However, defendant did not apprise the trial 
court of the inaccuracy or otherwise raise the issue either at the time the trial court made the 
14In addition to these convictions, the record also reported arrests for battery on 
two other occasions and for a hit and run offense, the dispositions of which were not 
available. PSI at 9-10. See State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1981) (holding that 
the sentencing judge may consider evidence of crimes for which the defendant has been 
charged, tried, and acquitted as well as for crimes for which the defendant has been 
charged but not tried); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding 
that "other criminal conduct may properly be considered, even though the defendant was 
never charged with it or convicted of it"); cf. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 
1986) (observing that the "[defendant's view that the trial judge was unduly influenced 
by defendant's arrest record is purely speculative"). 
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misstatement or in his Motion to Correct Sentence. R. 51-53. Accordingly, defendant failed 
to preserve the issue and he is now foreclosed from raising the matter for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[a] defendant 
is obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an 
appellate court"); see also State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Utah 1980) (noting that a 
defendant is permitted to know the substance of a presentence report in order to provide him 
with an opportunity "to prevent a court from proceeding on inaccuracies"). 
Even had the issue been preserved for appeal, the challenged statement, when viewed 
in light of the court's entire remarks at sentencing, was simply an observation that both 
defendants had committed substance abuse crimes. No particular emphasis was placed on 
either type of offense and it appears that the court viewed the two types of offenses as 
indistinguishable. Although the court may have articulated its thoughts more carefully, it at 
all times acknowledged that defendant's record was not as serious as that of Akauola.15 For 
example, before defense counsel addressed the court regarding Akauola's sentencing, the 
court observed that "Akauola's record is significantly worse than Mr. Katoa's." TOS at 11. 
When it sentenced defendant, the court noted that defendant "is not as evil as some of the 
people [] see[n] [] in court" and recognized that Akauola's "record shows much more serious 
criminal activity in the past," including a prior "incident [for reckless driving] where 
15Akauola's adult criminal record included convictions for disturbing the peace, 
two misdemeanor assault charges, attempted burglary (a class A misdemeanor), carrying 
a concealed weapon, possession of paraphernalia, receiving stolen property, taking a 
vehicle without consent, petty theft, vandalism, reckless driving, leaving the scene of an 
accident, and driving under the influence. PSI-Akauola at 10-11. 
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[Akauola] w[as] lucky [he] didn't kill anybody." TOS at 23. Directly following the 
statement challenged by defendant, the court said, "I do see a difference in prior record and 
conduct. I see Mr. Akauola as more culpable but not sufficiently more culpable to get a 
different sentence."16 TOS at 24. 
In any case, the PSI included other evidence, unchallenged by defendant, that 
supported the court's concern regarding defendant's past substance abuse.17 The PSI 
indicated that defendant, who was 30 at the time of sentencing, began using marijuana at the 
I 
age of 21. PSI at 1,15. Defendant had occasionally used marijuana since that time and even 
tried crystal methamphetamine and cocaine. PSI at 15. The PSI also suggests that defendant 
did not exercise good judgment after consuming alcohol. Defendant began drinking alcohol 
at the age of 16 or 17 and his drinking became much heavier when he moved to Utah. PSI 
at 14. The PSI reports that defendant seldom drank heavily on weekdays. PSI at 14. 
However, defendant reported that he customarily went to a bar at least one weekend night 
each week and %'would leave pretty intoxicated but still able to drive home/' PSI at 14. In 
light of the foregoing additional information, which was also before the trial court, any 
misstatement that defendant had been convicted of an alcohol-related offense was harmless 
at worst. 
16Given the context under which this follow-up comment was made, the trial 
court's reference to the culpability of the defendants does not appear to be to their 
comparative fault for the accident, but rather to the seriousness of their criminal histories. 
17Defendant did not challenge any information set forth in the PSI. TOS at 1. See 
Lipsky, 639 P.2d at 175 (presentence report provided to the defendant to provide him an 
opportunity to bring to the court's attention any inaccuracies). 
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3. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Character, 
Defendant also contends that the court did not give adequate consideration to certain 
factors regarding his character. Aplt. Brf. at 17. Again, however, defendant's contention is 
not supported by the record. Specifically addressing defendant's character, the court stated 
that defendant was clearly "not as evil as some of the people [] see[n] [] in court." TOS at 
23. Defendant acknowledges that the court credited him for "behav[ing] responsibly and 
appropriately" since the accident. TOS at 23. He also concedes that the court viewed 
defendant's remorse as "very sincere," concluding that defendant "obviously care[d] deeply." 
TOS at 23. Nevertheless, defendant contends that the court failed to give adequate 
consideration to "other" factors regarding his character. Aplt. Brf at 17. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court not only considered those "other" 
factors, but clearly relied on them in reaching its conclusion that defendant was remorseful 
and behaved responsibly since the accident. The fact that defendant expressed to the victims 
his remorse and offered to participate in mediation supports the court's conclusion that 
defendant was remorseful. Likewise, defendant's seeming acceptance of responsibility, 
including the offer to pay restitution, his efforts to provide for the future needs of his family, 
and his voluntary return from California, support the court's conclusion that he had behaved 
responsibly since the accident.18 Moreover, that defendant had not been in the criminal 
18Defendant contends that he cooperated with the investigation and admitted his 
involvement. Aplt. Brf. at 17. However, this claim is not entirely supported by the 
record. The investigating officer assigned to the accident reported that "neither 
[defendant nor Akauola] has been totally cooperative during the investigation," both only 
admitting to what was already known and "shifting] as much responsibility as possible 
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system since 1995 and had a fairly consistent work history since 1991 supported the court's 
conclusion that he was clearly not "as evil" as others who came through the criminal system. 
Had the court not considered these factors, it could not have reached the conclusions it did 
regarding defendant's character. 
4. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Rehabilitative 
Needs. 
Rehabilitation is among the legitimate purposes of incarceration, and, accordingly, a 
factor to be considered by the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). The court 
manifested its skepticism regarding defendant's prospect for rehabilitation when it indicated 
that defendant's prior record should have taught him better. TOS at 23. The court further 
manifested this skepticism when it sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms. 
However, recognizing the Board of Pardons' role in monitoring a prisoner's progress, the 
court stated, %'It will be up to the Board of Pardons to determine when you are out." TOS at 
24. 
Defendant argues that the consecutive sentences are not in accordance with his 
rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Brf. at 18. In support of this contention, defendant argues that 
neither the PSI nor the court suggested that he was a continuing threat to society or that his 
prospects for rehabilitation were unfavorable. Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. Defendant's argument 
essentially rests on the premise that a trial court abuses its discretion unless it imposes a 
sentence that accords controlling weight to the defendant's rehabilitative needs. Such a 
from themselves." PSI at 9. 
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premise is not supported by case law. The supreme court has unequivocally stated that 
"[incarceration may be for purposes other than rehabilitation." State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 
261, 268 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant relies heavily on Strunk, Smith, and Galli for his contention that the trial 
court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. However, the underlying facts 
and rationale that led to the reversal of consecutive sentences in these cases are not 
applicable to this case. 
In Strunk, the defendant pled guilty to three first degree felonies: murder, child 
kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The court sentenced the defendant to 
life imprisonment on the murder charge, a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years to life 
for child kidnapping, and a minimum mandatory term of nine years to life for aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1298. The court ordered that the sentences run 
consecutively, which would result in defendant's incarceration for at least 24 years. The 
supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion in running the sentences 
consecutively, finding that it had "fail[ed] to sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative 
needs in light of his extreme youth19 and the absence of prior violent crimes." Id. at 1302. 
The Court reasoned that "[w]hile imprisonment for that period of time, or even longer, may 
prove to be necessary and appropriate, the twenty-four year term robs the Board of Pardons 
of any flexibility to parole [the defendant] sooner." Id. at 1301. The court concluded that 
19Strunk was 16 years old at the time he committed the crimes. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 
1298. 
22 
a concurrent sentence was warranted under the circumstances of the case so as "to afford the 
Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust [the defendant's] prison stay to match his progress 
in rehabilitation and preparation to return to society." Id. at 1302. 
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of four first degree felonies: aggravated 
kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of sodomy on a child. 909 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 
1995). The trial court sentenced the defendant to a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen 
years to life on each count and ordered that they run consecutively. Id. The supreme court 
concluded that requiring the defendant to serve no less than 60 years in prison was 
"tantamount to a minimum mandatory life sentence," a sentence the legislature had reserved 
only for crimes of capital murder. Id. at 244-45. Observing that the "Board [of Pardons] is 
in a far better position than a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and 
possible progress toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence 
accordingly," the supreme court concluded that the consecutive sentences improperly 
divested the Board of its "discretion to release defendant, irrespective of his progress, until 
sixty years have elapsed." Id. at 244. 
In Galli, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to three charges of aggravated robbery. 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 931. The respective trial courts each sentenced the defendant to serve an 
indeterminate term of five years to life. Id. at 932-33. The last two courts to sentence the 
defendant ordered that the sentence be served consecutively with the others. Id. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the sentences, the defendant would be required to serve at least 15 
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years in prison.20 The supreme court overturned the consecutive sentences, finding that the 
trial courts failed to give adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances. Id. at 938. 
Again, as in Strunk and Smith, the supreme court in Galli concluded that a concurrent 
sentence "would better serve[] [the defendant's] rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board 
of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine 
progress toward rehabilitation." Id. 
Unlike the sentences in Strunk, Smith, and Galli, the consecutive prison terms in this 
case do not rob the Board of Pardons of its discretion to adjust the actual time defendant 
serves in prison. Although the judgment ordering consecutive prison terms increases the 
maximum possible term from five years to ten years, it does not in any way divest the Board 
of its discretion to release defendant early if his progress so warrants. Whether the resulting 
sentence is zero-to-five years or zero-to-ten years, the Board can grant as early a release as 
it deems appropriate. Indeed, the consecutive terms imposed by the trial court afford the 
Board with even greater latitude, allowing it to extend defendant's stay should his progress, 
or lack thereof, so dictate. In short, defendant's sentence does not pose the same concerns 
that were expressed by the supreme court in Strunk, Smith, and Galli. Defendant does not 
20Even though Galli's sentences of five years to life were ordered to run 
consecutively, the actual number of years Galli would be required to serve still would 
have been left to the Board of Pardons because they were indeterminate sentences. See 
Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that "the number of 
years a defendant will serve under an indeterminate sentence i s left to the unfettered 
discretion of the board of pardons'") (quoting Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and 
Parole, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991)). However, because the supreme court in Galli 
treated the sentences as minimum mandatory sentences, so too will the State for purposes 
of argument only. 
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face a minimum term of 60 years, 24 years, or even 15 years. Indeed, although defendant's 
conduct resulted in five deaths (unlike Strunk, Smith, or Galli), he does not even face a 
maximum term of 15 years.21 
C. Defendant's Claim that the Consecutive Prison Terms Violated the 
Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah Constitution is Without Merit. 
Lastly, defendant argues that the consecutive terms violate his right against ''unduly 
rigorous punishment" under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 5,20. 
This argument is without merit for three reasons. First, defendant failed to preserve this 
claim either at sentencing or in his Motion to Correct Sentence. See TOS at 1-24; R. 51-53. 
Having failed to raise the issue before the trial court, the appellate court will not now address 
defendant's constitutional claim on appeal. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654-55 n. 3. Second, 
defendant makes only vague references in his brief, without argument, to the constitutional 
provision. On the first page of his argument, defendant simply cites to section 9 in support 
of his claim that the consecutive sentences are "excessive and unfair in light of the 
circumstances of [defendant's] case." Aplt. Brf. at 5. The only other reference to the 
"unnecessary rigor" clause is on the last page of defendant's brief wherein he makes the 
conclusory statement that the consecutive sentences amount to "an unduly rigorous 
punishment in violation of [defendant's] right under Article I, section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution." Aplt. Brf. at 20. Because defendant "fails to establish how the protections of 
the unnecessary rigor clause apply to the facts of his case," this Court will not address the 
21Nor is defendant particularly young, a major factor upon which the supreme 
court in Strunk relied in vacating the consecutive terms. See Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1302. 
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argument. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654. Finally, although the full scope of the clause has not 
been articulated, the plain language of the clause "appl[ies] to the treatment of imprisoned 
persons and not to the terms of punishment." Id. (citing State v. M.L.C., 933 P.2d 380, 385 
(Utah 1997);Bottv.DeLand,922?.2d7329737(UtBh 1996)). Therefore, defendant's claim 
that the sentence violated the unnecessary rigor clause is not properly before this Court, and, 
in any event, is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, and in light of the character, 
history, and rehabilitative needs of defendant, which factors were duly considered by the trial 
court, it cannot be said that the court's imposition of consecutive prison terms is a sentence 
that no reasonable person would impose. Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. As such, the trial court 
acted within its discretion and the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this rlv\^ day of August, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^fety 
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Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KATOA, ALFRED P. 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was initially charged with Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Second Degree 
Felony, five counts. By negotiation he pled guilty to Automobile Homicide, Third Degree 
Felony, two counts. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Salt Lake District Attorney's file 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
On July 24, 1997 at approximately 3:00 pm, West Valley Police were informed of a multi-car 
accident at 4252 West 3100 South. The first officers on the scene found three cars and a 
parked flatbed truck involved with numerous injuries and several obvious fatalities. Additional 
emergency personnel were called in with dozens of police, fire and medical staff eventually 
participating. Injured parties were removed from the vehicles, several requiring sophisticated 
extraction procedures due to the mangled condition of the cars. Life Flight, Airmed and 
numerous ambulances were used in transporting the injured to various hospitals for treatment. 
Once all steps possible had been taken to treat the victims, officers began to piece together 
the facts which led to the accident, using the statements of witnesses at the scene, injured 
parties from the vehicles and physical evidence gathered at the scene. 
It was learned that a large group of Pacific Islanders had gathered earlier this date at Granger 
High School for a rugby tournament. A black Jeep on which an attempt to locate as a possible 
DUI was located amongst the vehicles in the Granger High School parking lot. A number of 
individuals were around the jeep, but nobody inside. Officers spoke with the individuals in the 
area and dumped out several beer cans, reportedly stating that consuming alcohol on those 
premises was not allowed. 
Some time later, two vehicles, a van and the black Jeep, left, reportedly to go to a private 
home for something to eat. Six individuals were in the van and four in the Jeep. Traveling 
westbound on 3100 South at a high rate of speed, the van pulled left of center, apparently to 
pass the Jeep. The Jeep sped up and/or swerved into the van to prevent it from passing. The 
van then lost control and collided with an eastbound Toyota containing two individuals. The 
van then continued a short distance to where it collided with a flatbed trailer. The Jeep then 
lost control and collided into the undercarriage of the truck trailer. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KATOA, ALFRED P. 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (continued) 
Killed instantly in the eastbound Toyota was Helene Sherlin, who was driving the vehicle. 
According to police reports, "It appeared that half of her head, face and throat had been torn 
away by the impact of the accident." Later attempts to retrieve a blood sample from Mrs. 
Sherlin proved futile, as an adequate sample could not be found in her body, even in the 
chambers of her heart. Robert Sherlin also received massive injuries, but was cut from the 
Toyota and rushed to the hospital. He died six days later of his injuries. 
Also dead at the scene from massive injuries were Sione Pilivi and Selanito Sitani, passengers 
in the van. Other van occupants injured and transported to various hospitals were Amanaki 
Moala, Kivalu Moa, Lamu Tongamana and Fred Katoa. Amanaki Moala later died of his 
injuries. Investigation showed Fred Katoa to have been the driver of the van. 
Occupants of the Jeep injured and transported to the hospital were Aisea Akauola, Sosiua 
Taufa and Samani Sekona. Mr. Akauola was identified as the driver of the Jeep. A fourth 
occupant, Andrew Kaufusi was injured, but seen running from the crash site. Two days later, 
he was interviewed by officers, who found him to be the least injured of all victims, suffering 
only from "major road rash". He, among other survivors, provided statements for officers. 
Blood samples were taken from Mr. Katoa and Mr. Akauola. Mr. Katoa showed Blood Alcohol 
of .02 with "metabolite for marijuana with non quantitative results." Mr. Akauola tested Blood 
Alcohol of .11, also with "metabolite for marijuana with non quantitative results." 
Accident ^constructionist discovered fresh rubber tire markings on the right side of the van 
and three separate contact areas, suggesting contact between the van and Jeep prior to 
collision. They also determined, basedon tire scuff marks on the road, that the Jeep and Van 
were traveling between approximately 79^81 mph at the time of the collision. 
On August 6, 1997, an interview was held with Fred Katoa. He admitted smoking two "joints" 
of marijuana at the park prior to the accident, as wallas drinking four beers. Tie recalled^ 
someone asking him to move out of the driver's seat due to his level of intoxication, but drove 
anyway. He stated he could not identify everyone in the van with him and stated he could not 
recall any part of the accident. 
On August 14, 1997, Officers searched a trailer full of miscellaneous debris from me accident 
scene, locating a blue bag containing drug paraphernalia, including: a 4" pipe, a T pipe, and 
hand scales. Also in the bag was a pay stub for Fred Katoa. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
West Valley City Police Case #97-41881 
DEFENDANTS VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
"It started Wednesday morning. I went to the rugby field with Amanaki and some other 
friends. We stayed there for a long while. I had drank some beer. A Policeman had come 
over to us and had us leave the park. We left the park and were going to a friend's house. As 
we were going Isaiah past me and cut in front of me. I then pulled forward into the median 
and got back along side of him. I then remember the jeep hitting the side of the van. 
There is nothing in this world that could of prepared me for the day that I woke up in the 
hospital and for the realization of what had happened. I can not in my heart and soul ever 
make it up to the people that lost there lives in this situation. I could not even begin to ask for 
forgiveness from there families because the lost being so great I would like for them to know 
that I wished that I could change things and that I did not even want or try to do this 
intentionally. If I could change places with any one of the victims I would. I know that nothing 
I do could make up for what has happened but I will never stop trying." 
7-6-98 /s/ Alfred Katoa 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant's handwritten statement 
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: 
Aisea Akauola pled guilty to identical counts on the same date as Mr. Akauola. He is also 
scheduled for sentencing on June 29,1998. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Third District Court records 
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KATOA, ALFRED P. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: 
Victim Impact Statements have been completed and returned by Robert and William Sherlin 
and Carol Pillard, the children of Bob and Helene Sherlin. Each asks the Court to impose the 
maximum sentence allowed by law in this case. Each of them, plus the other following family 
members who have written letters, ask that they be attached to this report and reviewed by the 
Court: Wayne Pillard, Peggy Sherlin, Sara Sherlin, Sheila Lebato, Carolyn Royal, Mary 
Elizabeth Densly and Carol Snyder. In addition, other, non-family members, have asked that 
their letters be attached and reviewed by the Court. They are: Dale and Ruth Acord, Shirley 
Rossy, Harry Fenuemo, Anna McEwen, Bob and Kathy Behoend, F.F. Carbone, Steven 
Patey, Laurel Casados, Patti Thomas, Charlotte Boardman, Rebecca Patrick and Paula Kertz. 
The following family members of Sione Pilivi and Moala Amanaki have also written letters 
expressing their grief and loss over the death of these individuals: Sione and Foakautu'u Pilivi, 
Veisinia Mo'ungaafi (on behalf of several others as noted in the letter), Falanisis Pilivi and 
family, Sione Kauvaka and Sosefina Pilivi and Dianna Pilivi. Other family member attending a 
family gathering in California may submit additional letters directly to the Court upon their 
return. 
The Salt Lake District Attorney's Office has reported they have been unsuccessful in 
maintaining contact with the family of the fifth fatality, Selanito Sitani. Correspondence sent to 
the listed family members has gone unanswered. This writer's calls to the telephone numbers 
available from the police reports and from the Victim/Witness caseworkers assigned to this 
case show them to no longer be assigned to any members of this victim's family. No input is, 
therefore, available from this family. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Victims as listed above. 
RESTITUTION: 
VICTIM STATUS CONTACT RESTITUTION 
^Moal^Amanaki Deceased Spoke to family members and 
encouraged them to submit all 
bills to Victim Reparations 
Victim Reparations 
Case #109286 
Amount paid to date: 
$27,688.59 
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Family members report 
medical and funeral expenses 
have been covered by various 
insurance companies. They 
have been encouraged to 
submit any additional 
expenses to Victims 
Reparations. 
Family members report 
medical and funeral expenses 
have been covered by various 
insurance companies. They 
have been encouraged to 
submit any additional 
expenses to Victims 
Reparations. 
Spoke to Family and referred 
them to Victims Reparation, as 
they indicate the subject's 
medical and funeral expenses 
remain outstanding. 
No contact possible, see above 
Family reports head & back 
injuries from which he has not 
yet fully recovered. Light 
headed and dizzy still and 
unable to work. Mentally "not 
all with i f and may never fully 
recover. Referred to Victim 
Reparation and invited to write 




Nothing paid to date 
because family has 




Nothing paid to date 
because family has 
not yet submitted 
request. 
No information 
available from family, 
but they have agreed 
to open a case with 
Victim Reparation 




$14,000 in medical 
expenses to date, 
plus ongoing 
treatment. Referred 
to Victim Reparation 
to open case. 
Family promised to 
follow through. 
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Family reports he received 
head, back, leg and arm 
injuries. Physically okay now, 
but "forgets a lot of things." 
Able to work again. Family 
invited to write letters to Court, 
but none received to date. 
Contact attempted, but 
unsuccessful with "Uncle Finu" 
with whom he reportedly lives 
in Fontana, California. 
Several unsuccessful attempts 
to contact at family home in 
West Jordan and one message 
left with unnamed family 
member. Message not 
returned and no further answer 
at that number. 
Family members in California 
report he is fully recovered and 
feeling well. They refuse, 
though to answer any other 
questions, giving conflicting 
statements as to where he is 
currently living. 
Approximately 
$7,000 in medical 
expenses to date, 
plus ongoing 
treatment. Referred 
to Victim Reparation 
to open case. 
Family promised to 
follow through 
No case yet opened 
with Victim 
Reparations and no 
other information is 
available. 
No case yet opened 
with Victim 
Reparations, 
although he has 
been instructed by 
the VictimA/Vitness 
Program to submit all 
expenses there. 
Cousin "Andrew" and 
1 unnamed adult 
| family member 
indicate they don't 
know what his 
expenses might be 
and refused to copy 
the phone numbers 
of Victim Reparation 
or this writer. J 
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RESTITUTION: (continued) 
Of all of the victims contacted to date, none are prepared to make a specific claim for 
restitution. All are referred to the Office of Crime Victim Reparations and it is suggested 
restitution be ordered as determined by that agency, subject to hearing, if the defendants so 
request. 
The insurance carrier for SMP Inc., owners of the flatbed trailer, has filed separate suit against 
the defendants to recoup their losses in this accident. As per the current practice of AP&P, 
this claim is not included in the above figures. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Victims as listed above 
CUSTODY STATUS: 
The subject was initially arrested on this offense September 4, 1997 and remained 
incarcerated until November 7, 1997. As of the date of sentencing, he will have been in 
custody a total of 64 days. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Salt Lake County Jail records 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: 
Detective Arman Casanova, West Valley Police Department, was assigned as the 
investigating officer following this incident. He states, "In twenty-four years of law 
enforcement, I've never seen anything that would equal this. The degree of damage to the 
vehicles, the physical trauma to the bodies of the deceased and the extent of injuries to the 
survivors clearly demonstrate the speed of the defendant's vehicles. Others can debate over 
which vehicle turned into the other first; was one vehicle actually just trying to pass and the 
other not allowing them to do so; were they actually racing or just messing around, etc." 
Detective Casanova believes none of this really matters. It is clear both drivers were acting 
with total disregard for the safety of themselves and others and both must be held totally 
accountable for the horrendous outcome. 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: (continued) 
Detective Casanova expresses the opinion that, although both defendants seem remorseful at 
present and may be basically good individuals, neither has been totally cooperative during the 
investigation of this case. Both admitted only to those things which were already known and 
.attempted to shift as much responsibility as possible away from themselves. Neither of the 
defendant's vehicle was covered by liability insurance and neither of them are prepared to 
cover the expense resulting from this accident. He believes the defendants have already 
received all consideration they might deserve in this matter by the reduction in the charges 
against them and suggests consecutive sentencing is in order. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Detective Arman Casanova, Investigating Officer 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
Mr. Katoa denies having a juvenile violation history in California and records show he does not 
have one in Utah. Considering his adult record, this is surprising, causing the subject to 
voluntarily explain, "I didn't start drinking until I was eighteen and that's when I started getting 
into trouble." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant and Utah State Juvenile Court 
ADULT RECORD: 
DATE AGENCY OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
4-14-89 CAMC-Ontario, CA Obst/Resist P.O. Convicted Misd-Probation 
6-25-89 SO-San Bern, CA Battery w/Serious Bodily Convicted Misd-Jail 
Injury 
9-27-89 SO-San Bern, CA Hit & Run-Prop Damage Not reported 
Obst/Resist P.O. 
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SO-San Bern, CA Assault Deadly Weapon Dismissed 
Burglary, 1st Deg Dismissed 
Vandalism Convicted Misd-180 days & Prob 
PD-SoSLC, UT Cont Del Minor 




Dismissed (Warrant not served) 
4-5-93 SO-San Bern, CA Obst/Resist P.O 
Battery 






SO-San Bern, CA Battery 
SO-San Bern, CA Battery 
SO-San Bern, CA Transp Cont Sub 
Poss Cont Sub for Sale 
Inflict Corp Inj Cohab 
Battery 
Vandalism 
PD-SVC, UT Criminal Homicide 
Convicted Misd-Prob/Jail 




Convicted Inflict Corporal Inj-
Misd; Poss Cont Sub-Misd; 
Battery-Misd, Probation/Jail 
CURRENT OFFENSE 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
UBCI SID#345960, FBI# 737801TA6 & Third District Court records 
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DRIVING HISTORY: 
No citations found. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Utah DLD#151847210 
PENDING CASES: 
There are no known pending cases against this defendant. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
UBC r~'if^45PR0,l rR'£ 7 '> ' 'Pf , <T» r <- ' - - ' - • 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
Mr. Katoa has been on what he describes as informal, Court probatiu . nuns!-.. . __ n 
California, but never has been on probation supervision of any kind in ' itah. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, UBCISID#345bL. . „ . „, , . . 
Probation and Parole records 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: 
Alfred Katoa was born on February 18, 1968 in Tonga, the twelfth of thirteen children of Viliam 
and Lesieli Katoa. At the age of four, the subject came with his parents and several of the 
other children to the U. S., living with an uncle in Coocamonga, California for a couple of 
years, while saving to buy their own home in Etiwanda, California. There, his father worked as 
a machine operator, usually working two full-time jobs, allowing his mother to remain in the 
home as a housewife. The family maintained a lower middle-class lifestyle. At the age of 
sixteen, the subject completed the process to become a naturalized citizen of the U.S. 
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (continued) 
Mr. Katoa reports a close, loving, supportive relationship with all family members, immediate 
and extended. He reports no serious abuse or other problems, although he states when ; 
necessary, his father did not hesitate to punish him for wrongdoing. He remained in their 
home, taking over primary support of his parents as his father became more aged. In 1996, 
his father passed away and the subject quick claimed the family home, which was in his name, 
to his sister, as she wished to accept primary responsibility for caring for their mother. He 
states he is still in very close contact with his mother and all siblings. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
MARITAL HISTORY: 
The subject has never married, but he has been involved in a relationship for almost ten years 
with Christie Olden. Together, they have had three children: Justin, 6 yrs old; Saia, age 5 and 
Epenisa, fours years old. She is expecting a fourth child which is due in August, but current 
plans are for the defendant's sister to adopt the child, which "in my culture is quite acceptable 
since my sister can't have any kids and it only makes me love her more that she is willing to do 
this and fit into the family the way she is." The defendant and Ms Olden have been separated 
on several occasions for up to three months, but always reunite. He indicates that while he is 
incarcerated for the current offenses, she intends to return to California, where she will live 
with the children in the subject's mother's home. He believes that with the support of his 
family, Christie and the children will be fine while he is away, although he writes, ul will have to 
try to make it up to them. The time that I will lose I don't think I will be able to make up 
because of their ages. I will miss them growing up and for that I am truly sorry." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
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EDUCATION: 
The subject attended public schools in California, achieving average grades and having no 
serious problems until his junior year. He explains, "I got into a fight with three Mexican 
gentlemen who jumped me. We all got expelled. Then they let me back in to play football for 
my senior year, then got kicked out again for another fight 
Later, after coming to Utah, the subject tried to return to finish school at West Jordan High 
School, but after a couple of months, he was offered a job where he could make some very 
good money to try and support his family, so he quit and has never gone back. He hopes to 
be able to finish school in the next few months, while incarcerated. 
SOURCE OF
 | N F 0 R M A T | Q N : 
The defendant, Christie OIIIIPII riirlfin im! ami Ni'n-i PHIIHI.I isfer 
GANG AFFILIATIONS: I 
The ~;ates, "When you're in California and are I ongan, the police will always label you 
a Tc »np. In reality, I when I was young, I was caught up in it a little and the truth was 
you had to hang with the group or you hung alone and that was dangerous. So I guess I 
was in a gang, although I didn't get in all that much trouble with them and never considered 
myself a gang member." \ 
Local records do not show the defendant as being actively involved in gang activities in Utah 
and he states escaping the gang environment was one of the major reasons he wanted to 
move to Salt Lake 
SOUKUb I: 
The defendant and Salt Lake Area Gang Project recbrds. 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: 
1 he defendant has always enjoyed relatively good physical health and has never suffered any 
serious illnesses, injuries or accidents until the current offense occurred. During the wreck, 
both of his lungs were collapsed, both shoulders and his right scapula were broken, his right 
leg was shattered and considerable rebuilding was necessary His right ear was almost 
PAGE 14 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KATOA, ALFRED P. 
PHYSICAL HEALTH:(continued) 
completely cut off. He has somewhat recovered, but is no longer able to participate in sports 
or heavy physical labor. He currently takes no prescription medications. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
MENTAL HEALTH: 
Mr. Katoa has never undergone any form of mental health evaluation or treatment and feels 
that until the current offense, he had a positive attitude toward life. Since this incident, he has 
struggled with overwhelming remorse and depression as he asks why he allowed this to 
happen. He states, "I can never make it up to the people I did this too, both those that I never 
had a chance to know and my close friends. There is now way I can ever fix that. I just have 
to live with it someway. The other day I saw one of my friend's kids and I can just can't 
believe that I took something from that I can never replace, their father." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
ALCOHOL HISTORY: 
The subject first began to use alcohol at the age of sixteen or seventeen. As he came to Utah 
at the age of eighteen, his drinking became much heavier, although seldom did he drink 
heavily on weekdays when he was working, but only on the weekends. He reported he would 
generally go to the bar with a brother or friend at least one weekend night per week and 
"would leave pretty intoxicated but still able to drive home." Despite this pattern, he had no 
DUI arrests and apparently felt a certain comfort level driving after several drinks, as occurred 
on the occasion of the current offense, when he consumed approximately four beers before 
driving away from the park. He states, "My memory of that day is not clear, but I don't 
remember being drunk, but I knew I'd had a few over a period of time." 
Since this incident, the subject has drank a few times, but always at home or at a friend's, 
don't go out any more. I definitely don't drive any more when I've had anything to drink. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The Hi'faniliinl, nimsln n|i| iini, i|iillii ml iiiiiiil Mir'.H Primiii, "iirslni 
DRUG HISTORY: 
j l i e s u | } j e C | | } e g a n |Q u s e m a r j j u a n a a | |he age of about twenty-one. He used this occasionally 
for years, then eventually tried crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, but did not enjoy either 
of these substances. He says, "I would never buy marijuana, but if somebody ever offered 
me some, I would share it with them," This continued until the day of this offense, "When I 
believe I smoked some earlier in the day when somebody gave me some, but I don't 
remember getting high Tl lei • 3 were a lot of us sharing it, so I probable only got about three 
hits on it that day." 
Since the accident, the si ib ject has not used any marijuana or any other substance. 
S Q U R C E Q F | N F 0 R M A T | Q N : 
Thede^--1—' ••>—*- ~ , J—
 r 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
The d ill end am I s bum uiillll .m 1 111111 III, l l i i inl ier is bLiU III Li.1 I 
EMPLOYER WAGE TITLE START/END FOR LEAVING 
T & J Concrete $354 wonk finisher 12-97 to present Currently employed 
MOIIIII mi StatPS $11firihi l i nnh f i 1996 to 7-97 
Upland Ro r $10.00 1993 to 1995 Moved in 
& Grill 
SeaGate Maqru tn T i l Mil In h lnn| i i i 1991 to 1993 Wenttojail 
When not employed elsewhere, the subject works with his brothers who work as handymen, 
doing construction, remodeling, landscaping, etc. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
Currently, the subject earns about $1600 a month. He pays rent of $500 a month, plus utilities 
of $130 a month. He states his only debt is $20,000 in restitution in California for a vandalism 
case where he is being held accountable for the entire amount, as his two co-defendants have 
paid nothing. His current income seems adequate to meet his immediate needs, other than 
this old restitution. His family is prepared, if necessary, to relocate to California if he is 
incarcerated. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
MILITARY RECORD: 
The defendant has never served in the military. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: 
Collateral #1: Christie Olden, girlfriend 
Ms. Olden has written a letter to the Court, describing her perception of the subject's grief over 
this incident and explaining what a good husband and father he is. Understanding a price 
must be paid for this crime, she asks the Court for understanding and a degree of mercy for 
the sake of her and their children. Her letter is attached. 
Collateral #2: Nisa Pauga, sister 
The defendant's sister's letter is also attached, again asking the Court to temper the 
punishment required by this case for the sake of the defendant's family. 
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS (contii - • I) 
Col lateral #3 : Victor ia Vasquez , friei n cl 
Ms. Vasques wri tes concern ing the defendant 's strengths and good wil l , • :itii ig till IIE • i : s = .ist ai : • = • 
he has given her in guiding a young son through troubled times. The assui es til ie Com I: tl le 
defendant has learned a great lesson already from this accident. 
Collateral #4: James Strickland and Betty Fuentes, former co-workers 
Both of *-t:v r :^; • • written letters attesting to lllllie s!ib|pft's n "mil 
C h a r a C t o i c l h u c lS f \ iuy u i c w u u i i IUI I.IO.UV. Both letters are attached. 
Collateral #5: John Ondrusek, former supervisor 
I am writing this on i>-r,r* • * Fred Kat ! r r ; s supervisor for a period of time while he 
worked at Mountain Sta*- enching in Salt Lake >
 } I was a friend before he worked there 
also. i 
Fred was always a ve:, y-j_.. • / , . :^ ric .as on time each day, and he rarely missed a da:;; r 
of work. He was like my ass stant manage:. I le was in charge m I iien I wasn't on the job site. I 
felt very confident that he could handle any problem: that might ar ise 
As far as a friend, he was honest and loyal, he » me kind of person that could cheer people 
up, look at the bright side of things. He always anneared to be a good husband and a good 
father to his kids. 
When I heard of the accident, I had a great deal of remorse for the victims. I also felt sorry for 
Fred too, because I know he would never hurt anyone intentionally. When I saw Fred after the 
accident he expressed a lot of sorrow and remorse fir everyone involved. He told me that he 
had to change his life, and that he had quit drinking. Even though he never seemed to have a 
drinking problem, all it takes is one time, and I think Fred knows that better than anyone. 
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued) 
speaking to young people about the dangers of drinking and driving. He has a very influential 
personality, maybe he could get through to someone and save some lives." 
JohnOndrusek 
Collateral #6: Howard Lemke, prosecutor 
Mr. Lemke spoke with this writer at great length about this offense and the tremendous impact 
it has had on dozens, probably hundreds, of people. He explained that one officer on the 
scene remarked that on arrival he though dispatch had made a mistake and that he had been 
sent to the sight of a massive explosion, because of the extent of property damage and the 
condition of the dead, dying and injured. Many of the officers and medical personnel who were 
involved in this incident have required counseling to deal with it. This is especially true of the 
officer who asked the rugby players to leave the park when he found them drinking, not 
apparently realizing the condition of the drivers. 
Mr. Lemke states that in actuality, both defendants are probably reasonably nice people, and it 
is obvious they were just having a good time, taking the spirit of competition from the rugby 
field onto the roadway with them. Despite this, their actions were totally inexcusable and they 
must face the consequences. He states the Sherlin family, understandably, insists that 
maximum sentences be given to both defendants. He does not have a clear picture, though, 
of the feelings of the other three families, as they have not been totally open to communication 
from the police or his office. He does request that the Court carefully review the statements of 
all victim's family members in deciding this case. 
Collateral #7: Debra Creek-Mendez, defense counsel 
The defendant's counsel also spoke with this writer, discussing many of the fine points of the 
case, then submitting a letter from David Lord of Accident Reconstructionist and Cause 
Analysis, challenging the original finding of investigating officers regarding the speed of the 
vehicles and also reviewing information suggesting the Jeep ran into the van at some point 
prior to the actual collision. While not attempting to excuse her client based on this 
information, she asked that this letter be attached to this report for the court's information Ms. 
Mendez further emphasizes the sincere sorrow felt by her client over his actions leading to the 
deaths of these people. She knows he is prepared to pay whatever price is determined by the 
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued) 
Court, but adds her hope Dial sentencing i nul JU IIJI J I lliuiil 'I Imlln i -'in linn, i lln • 
defendant's family. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: 
Facing the Court for sentencing on two counts of Third Degree Felony ML/. 
a thirty year old male who one of two drivers racing down a narrow urbar . .. _ , _, , ; 
control of their vehicles and smashed into an oncoming vehicle, then a semi-tracer. 
Five people died in the accident and others, including the defendant were seriously injured. 
Neither Mr. Katoa nor his co-defendant were covered by any type of liability insurance, leaving 
many tens of thousands of dollars to be paid. To date, most victims have not compiled their 
final restitution requests, but all who can be contacted have been encouraged to submit their 
information to the Office Of Crime Victim Reparation. Restitution to reimburse this agency for 
payment of these claims is recommended. 
Mr. Katoa was born ii nga, but came to the States at an early age IA/OS raised primarily 
in California, in a str it loving home, but has also spent considerable time in Utah since 
his mid teen years. 3t married, but has had three children with his girlfriend often 
years and they are >ectii ig a fourth child later this year. He has a good employment history 
and appears to accept i E sp c i isifc iillliit; for his family. Conversely over the past ten, years, the 
defendant has h 1 i = -\ :: i is ai i = sts, i i many appearing to be consistent with his self-report of 
association with gang
 m e m b e r s j n California. He also admits heavy alcohol use and some use 
of controlled substances, both of which contributed to the current offense. It is of concern that 
the defendant admittedly has continued to drink. 
It would appear Mr. Katoa is truly sorry for his involvement in the current offense. He also 
understands that the Court must hold him accountable for this crime. He does have the 
support of a family who seems prepared to deal; with the consequences of this offense. 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:(continued) 
Nonetheless given the horrendous nature of this crime and loss suffered by so many Mr Kafoa 
must serve a substantial period of imprisonment. Hopefully, such sentence will serve not only 
to deter him but others who are aware of this case, and future tragedies of this type reduced. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
GARY L. THOMPSON, 
CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
0-HERINE C. SHEPHERD, AF 
COURT SERVICES UNIT 
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION 
It is respectfully recommended by the Adult Probation and Parole Court Services Unit the 
defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years on each count, with the terms 
to run consecutively. It is further recommended he be ordered to pay restitution to reimburse 
the Office of Crime Victim Reparations for all claims submitted in relation to this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
GARY L. THOMPSON, 
CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPR'-' r r i , 
Y 1 
KATHERINE C. SHEPHERD, ARA 
COURT SERVICES UNIT 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS) 
PRIOR MISD. CONVICTIONS 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS) 
(INCLUDES DUI AND RECKLESS) 
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 
PRIOR JUVENILE REFERRALS 
(FINDINGS OF DELINQUENT FOR 
INCIDENTS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
FELONIES IF COMMITTED BY AN ADULT) 
[3 NON-STATUS MISD.=FELONY] 
SUPERVISION HISTORY 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
SUPERVISION RISK 

























NONE CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY 
ONE 0 POOR 
TWO FAIR 12-15 
THREE MODERATE 8-11 





TWO TO FOUR 
FIVE TO SEVEN 
MORE THAN SEVEN 
NONE 
ONE 0 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE 
CORRECT CATEGORY 
TWO TO FOUR 
MORE THAN FOUR 
SECURE PLACEMENT 
NO PRIOR SUPERVISION 
PRIOR SUPERVISION 
PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
PRIOR REVOCATION 
CURRENT SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS 
FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFF.) OR OUTSTANDING-
WARRANT 
ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROG. OR EXTRADITION 
REQ'D 
ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT 
WEAPONS ENHANCEMENT 
(ACTIVE OFFENSE) 






NONE "NOTE: 2nd FIREARMS 
OTHER CONVICTION REQUIRES A 
KNIFE MANDATORY 5-10 YR 
FIREARM OR EXPLOSIVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE* 
GENERAL DISPOSITION MATRIX 
CRIME SEVERITY 
CAPITAL 1ST DEGREE PERSON CRIMES OTHER CRIMES 
MURII OTHER HOMICIDE 2ND DEG 3RD DEG 2ND DEG 3RD DEG 








$10,000 $5,000 $5,000 
PRISON 
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DRUG DISTRIBUTION OR INTENT TO DIST. OVER $500 & RESID. BURGLARY SHOL _ _ _ J Jl-IES 
i 11vie: ivi/-* X 
USED TO CALCULATE MINIMUM TIME IF SENTENCE IS INCARCERATION 
CAPITAL 1ST DEGREE PERSON CRJ1 IES 01 Il HEIR CRIMES 
MISDEMEANORS 
MUR II OTHER HOMICIDE 2ND DEG 3RD DEG 2ND DEG 3RD DEG a B 
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DRUG DISTRIBUTION OF OR INTENT TO DIST. OVER $500 & RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY SHOUI D BE "PERSON" 
CRIMES 
ACTIVF CONVICTIONS 
D t b r t t L TnAr.i 
1
 i f Ser ious Auto Homic ide 3rd 
I I I II If A I I 
i H i m u s 
II mil 
I I'll i 
ill Homic ide 6 
SEN FENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER, THfe EXISTENCE OF THE FOLLOWING 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: 
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE 
2. UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED 
3. UNUSUAL VICTIM VULNERABILITY 
4. INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY 
5. OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR DEPRAVITY 
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE, USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS PORTION OF THE 
TIME MATRIX" FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE "MOST SERIOUS" CONVICTION. 
FORM4 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
(Use Form 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations) 
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the guidelines. Reference 
the page number of the presentence investigation where the judge can find supportive 
information. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in the conviction offense or the 
calculation of criminal history score. 
PSIPage# 
9-10 1. Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
3. Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
2-3 4. Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
5. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
2-3 6. There were multiple charges or victims. 
7. Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting. 
8. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest. 
9. Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify as an high 
risk offender. 
10. Other (specify)_ 
Mitigating Circumstances 
_ 1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm. 
. 2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though 
failing to establish a defense. 
_ 4. Offender is young. 
_ 5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes. 
_ 6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
. 7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
. 8. Domestic crime victim does not incarceration. 
m 9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family 
relationships. 
.10. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents. 
.11. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
.12. Other (specify) 
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GARY L THOMPSON. INC 
4560 W 1975 N, OGDEN, UT 84404 
PHONE (801) 731 -9189 FAX (801) 73?-
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, 
i HAVE BEEN WITH FRED FOR THE LAST 9 YEARS AND HAVE RAISED 3 CHILDREN 
WITH HIM. I HAVE ALSO BEEN WITH HIM FROM THE BEGINNING EVER SINCE THE 
ACCIDENT. I HAVE BEEN THERE FOR HIM AND HAVE HELPED HIM WITH THE PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY THAT HE HAS HAD FROM THE CAR ACCIDENT ANO I DO 
KNOVy HOW SORRY HE REALLY IS. HE HAS TOLD ME HE FEELS DEEPLY SORRY FOR 
THE FAMILIIES OF THOSE WHOM HAVE DIED BEING A FATHER HIMSELF HE WOULd 
NOT KNOW WHAT HE WOULD DO IF IT WAS ONE OF HIS OWN. HE IS A VERY GOOO 
FATHER AND IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF HIS CHILDRENS LIVES. HE IS ALSO A VERY 
SPECIAL CAMPANION TO ME. I KNOW HE HAS TO PAY FOR WHAT HE HAS DONE BUT 
PLEASE DO NOT MAKE HIM PAY FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE. AS IT iS, WHAT HAS 
HAPPENED WILL ALWAYS BE A PART OF US AND IS SOMETHING WE AS A FAMILY WILL 
NEVER FORGET. LIVING WITH HIM EVERYDAY SINCE THEN I DO KNOW HE IS SORRY 
AND HAS LEARNED HIS LESSON, BUT HIS CHILDREN AND I NEED HIM TO HOLD OUR 
FAMILY TOGETHER FINANCIALLY AND AS A FATHER AND A HUSBAND. 
SINCERELY 
CHRISTIE OLDEN 
£d Wd£t>:0l 86St ST *""f 9£9£ 6sz see : 'ON SNOW sasnow • uottJ 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, 
THING AND I KNOW HE REGRETS HIS INVOLVMENT. I DO KNOW HE IS SORRY 
AND FEELS FOR THE FAMILIES THAT HAVE LOST LOVE ONES I KNOW MY 
BROTHER IS A VERY LOVING PERSON AND HE WOULD NEVER HAVE DONE 
ANYTHING LIKE THIS INTENTIONALLY MY CONCERN NOW IS FOR HIS 
NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS FAMILY. HIS CHILDREN APE STILL Y O U ^ SO 
I HOPE THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO BE RAISED BY THDR OWN FATHER. 
HE BRINGS TO OUR FAMILY A STRONG BOND THAT KEEPS US TOGETHER AND CLOSE, 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING IN CONSIDERATION OUR FEELINGS 
MNi I M I 
'^ftwjfahjup* 
M -H'.f \i. Bfcfc | 9C9S 6S? 506 : -DM 3NQHJ SMS'OU : UCSJ 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter is concerning the character of Fred Kataa, I have known Fred] 
since 1990. He is a kind and gentle young individual. He knows what he 
wants in life, but finds it hard to get there. I have talked to him since he nad 
the accident, and I know he regrets what happened, and that he was 
responsible for the life's that were lost. Fred has always been a caring 
person, since I have known him. He helped with me with my fourteen year 
old son when he was getting into trouble at school. He talked with him and 
told him he needed to do something with his life now that he was young] He 
needed to stay in school and learn as much as he could to have a better lijfc 
Fred is a person the younger kids look up to because of his personality and 
his concern for the younger kids to respect and listen to their parents, I will 
always have the greatest admiration for Fred because he is very intelligent 
and knows how to talk to people He is a good person mat I am glad to know 
and he will always be my friend. 1 will never forget the way Fred helped me 
with my son and my son remembers what Fred did for him. My son is now a 
productive 21 year old, with an apartment of his own and a good paying job, 
making it on his own. 1 know Fred will be a productive citizen and that the 
accident made him more aware of life and what he needs to do and will|do it. 
FROM: 
VICTORIA VASQUEZ 
6805 PALM DR. 
LOS ANGELS CALIF. 91701 
L, . T\\Or+yp SOK) 
Mountain States Trenching, Inc. 
169 W 2700 So. 
SJLC.UT 84115 
Phont* auM*'%.*7*7 
FAX 101-486 3770 
June 11, 1998 
To when It Hay Oonoarns 
X » tht Vice President of Mountain States Treodhing# Inc. and have in the 
past employed Freddie Xatoa as a Fbramn on our construction crows. He is 
a very dependable and loyal employee and X never had to worry about leaving 
hia In charge of a project when I had to leave the site, 
I know of his trouble regarding the auto accident and the loos of 
and I kno« tor a fact that he is very repentant and would change p. 
thaee deceased if possible* He has said Chat he vishee he could make i 
the families left behind, but know that is impossible also, so he is 
to take his punishment and try to do the bast he can now, 
I think he has learned a valuable lesson from this tragic ocourajnee and he 
oculd aure talk to other youig people and oaytoe Stop them from doing the saos 
things he has done and making the ease sdstakas. I think a court could find 
oomemy he can be a useful person to society and still pay far his mistakes* 
It seeeis like it is a vast* incarcerate him for a long period of time ^nd it 
vill not bring back the loved ones who are gone no*. 
I hope you can help hin to pay for hi* mistakes and still be a good ciiizen 
and not a hardened criminal. 1 have faith in Freddie and I know he will] try. 
Sin»?relyf 
/*> 
S t r i f i il 
vice President 












June 12, 1996 
Tto Hhom It Way Concern: 
X an writing this letter on behalf of rrad Katca* who vorkad with « let 
/fountain States Trenching, inc. for quite a While* and X haw heard df 
his tragic accident, with fatal injuries to other parties. X just want 
to aay that Fted was always a nice perean and reliable at work. He vap 
in talking to the guys here and he itada the statement *I wish I could 
trade place* with the people vho died in that accidant, and that it Ax* 
haa tau^it hiai a leeaon about responsibility when behind a wheel or a] 
in a oar." 
I hope you can be lenient with hi*, as I feel he haa really learned hla 
leeean and will never forget vhat haa happened to him and nnt of alii to 
the families of the deceased. He really SK»OB to be very depressed about 
the lives lost through hia carelessness and he will naver forget it. I 
know tie tea to pay for hia mistake, but I hope you can help hi© not tp 
become another good peraon that fell through the cracks of life. 
I really think he haa learned hla learnt and ia ready to take the punishment 
thet ia metea out to him, aa he knows he can not change things HOT* eyen tho 
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Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis 
P.O. Bo* 1**13 • Silt Like Cityi Utih 841164)613 
Phone (801) 973-8756-Fax (801) 292-3597'E-MilI DGLORD@WORLDNETlAl I 
JUne 
Ms. Deborah Kreech Mendes 
Attorney at Law 
424 East 500 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Ms, Mendes; 
Ihn investigating j^Q^dent ^nC0netruotionist in the 
captioned case calculated the speed of the vehicles to be 
in the area of 79 to 81 miles per hour. The metnod used 
f n make this calculation was Critical Speed from skid 
marks. This is a valid way of determining speed in SOME 
cases. What is necessary to correctly use this! concept 
is to plot the radius traveled by the Center of Mass (CM) 
i f the vehicle. If the vehicle in question is mQff 
Tracking", sliding, as in this case the marks made by 
tires no longer reflect the path of the Center of Mass. 
Speed estimates from this improper use of the! concept 
will ALWAYS produce higher numbers than the vehicle is 
actually traveling. Also speeds * 1 he AIMS ox 80 MPH 
are beyond the capability of vehicles of this type when 
considering the acceleration distance traveled after 
negotiating a 90 degree corner. Using the tire marks of 
i  sliding car to plot the travel of CM I \ contrary to 
Accident Reconstruction teachings and authority*;. 
Because the police focused on unit skid mark, obs 
of evidence that would allow a peed estimate 
therefore a reslistic calculation iff impossible. 
ejrvations 
s lost, wa 
and In regards to physical
 COntact between the Van 
there is a tire scrub on the right side of the Vah 
mark is similar fm i close parentheses, exampl 
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being turned left out of it's wheel well/ and coming in 
contact with another vehicle. A turn to the right would 
leave the opposite mark, *(M. From this evidence I aan 
conclude the Jeep, at some point turned into the!aide of 
the Van. 
If you have further questions contaot my office. 
O.ncerely, 
David 6, Lord 
• Northwestern University'a Traffic Institute 
Institute'of Police and Technical Management 
Society of Automotive Engineers 
Accident Reconstruction by Collins 
Highway Collision Analysis by Collins £ Morris] 
Handbook for the Accident Reconstructionist by Lofgren 
Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction I by Lacy 
& BarEelay 
Law and Order Magasine 
Computerised Accident Reconstruction 
Addendum B 
CTr o vft 0 ^ ^ a^> 
Itlrt Judicial District 
OCi 6 1998 
SALTL-w-.LCOJttTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 





Alfred P. Katoa and Aisea Akauloa 
Defendant. 
Case Nos. 971016306 
971016307 
The above entitled cause of action came 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henriod, a Judge of the Third District 
Court, of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, 
on Monday, July 20, 1998. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
f J/6f?-<24 
Howard Lemcke 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Deborah Kreeck Mendez 
Legal Defender Association 
424 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, :ah 
Randall C. Allen 
KIRTON 8c McCONKIE 
60 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RLED 
UtahConrtoMoceafs 
JAN 8 - 1939 
Julia Dfltosandro 
Cierx or the Court 
0 0 0 0 7 6 
1 
Monday, July 2 0, 19 98 Video transcription 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
VOICE: Are you calling these together, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I prefer to do them together. 
Anybody object to having them together? 
MR. LEMCKE: The State has no objection. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: No, objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We will start with Ms. Kreeck 
Mendez on Mr. Katoa. Is there anything in the Presentence 
Report that ought to be corrected? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Allen, how about in 
Akauloa? 
MR. ALLEN: Nothing, other than the few things I 
mentioned in my statement. Nothing of a major 
significance. 
THE COURT: Then let's go ahead and address 
sentencing. Let me hear again from Ms. Kreeck Mendez 
first and then Mr. Allen. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, if I might 
approach. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I would ask if -- this is a 
tox report and I'd ask that it be included in the file. I 
2 
would like to handle the business end of that first before 
we get into what we call "more emotional." 
I have submitted these because there is a real, 
very real possibility of prison today. I have submitted 
this and the accident reconstructionist's statement. I 
will be the only lawyer Alfred can ever have. He will 
never be able to afford a lawyer in this case. There is 
already a civil litigation pending. I am submitting these 
because I think they may make a difference to the parole 
board, if that is in fact what happens here, and the 
parole board only considers on their first review the 
matters that are in the file. Additionally, I want the* 
court file to fully reflect the situation in this case 
because there is going to be litigation. I know there 
will be restitution orders, but there is an insurance 
company that has already filed an action and served 
Alfred in this matter. 
I will ask the families of the victims here and 
the victims and the court to please be patient. I would 
like to remind everyone that I have a job to do and my job 
is not discounting the victims but to present Alfred's 
position, his side, his feelings on this, fully and 
completely. So as I am going through statements and it 
may sound like I am minimizing the tragedy that occurred 
here, I am not. The police investigated from their 
3 
perspective. We investigated from Alfred's perspective. 
The tragedy here has never been questioned by anyone at 
all, but I need to make the record and I need to present 
the full picture here so we have what the police 
investigated, in addition to what Alfred has talked to me 
about, and what our investigator came up with. 
I tell you right upfront, Your Honor, what I 
would prefer the court to do is to give Alfred two years 
in jail. No credit for time served. No good time and 
have him completely serve those, and then he be placed on 
probation after that. The matrix is an alternative 
recommendation and in any other case I would feel 
confident that that is the way the court would go. 
However, the tragedy is immense here, but I would ask the 
court to please keep that recommendation in mind. If the 
court is not inclined to go that way, we would ask at 
least for a concurrent sentence in this matter. 
These cases are probably the hardest for me to 
work with, these alcohol-related accidents or accidents of 
any kind because you don't have malice. You don't have 
people running around in anger, and everybody, it is a 
tragedy. Alfred's friends and family go gone. He has -, 
made his remarks to some people personally, some of the 
victims, some of the victim's family. He wants to make 
some remarks today at the close of my arguments to those 
4 
people he hasn't talked to before. 
I think it is critical that we let the court 
know and the family know that our investigation indicated 
that the speed was substantially less than the police 
indicated and as you saw in the accident reconstruction 
comments. It was still in excess of the appropriate speed 
there, particularly in light of the fact that it was a 
busy day, that the street was crowded. They were not 
racing. 
THE COURT: How about the police findings that 
they were actually smashing into each other car? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Well, that is my next point 
is, what happened here is they were not drag racing. 
Aisea passed, Alfred passed, they were losing control of 
each other. There is no doubt that their behavior was 
irresponsible. And we have this tox report where there-is 
not a lot of alcohol. It is .02, but it doesn't excuse 
the extreme conduct here that should not have been 
occurring. 
At every meeting I have had with Alfred, every 
meeting, he talks about how this was completely avoidable. 
That he should not have been trying to get back around 
Aisea. They shouldn't have been even passing there, and 
he knows that. And so when I talk about these things, I 
want the specifics known but it is not that Alfred says he 
5 
didn't do anything wrong. He set into motion a tremendous 
tragedy here, a busy day, a parked semi, a lot of people 
and an enormous, enormous tragedy. One of the worst in 
our valley's history as far as car accidents go. 
I want to make it clear. In the report it 
talks about how he doesn't have much memory. That is not 
from alcohol. Alfred was extremely injured in this whole 
case, and some pieces have come back. I remember talking 
to him in the jail shortly after the accident occurred, 
and him talking about, "I remember the trees waving." 
That is his memory of the accident initially. 
The officer said that he hasn't been helpful. 
I don't know how he can say that and listen to the tape. 
He talked in the hospital while he was still injured. He 
didn't ask for a lawyer, and he knew he could ask for a 
lawyer. They told him that. He spoke in the hospital 
with officers. They came into his house when he was 
convalescing after being at home. Alfred has significance 
ties to Tonga. He could have walked at any time. He had 
family who was willing to help him. He has ties in 
California. As a matter of fact, he was in California. 
He could have walked at any time but he has throughout 
been here and been prepared to take responsibility for 
this case. 
Which brings me to, I would like to thank the 
6 
court and Ms. Stoic (phonetic) and the victims who allowed 
us to continue that. When Alfred was picked up on traffic 
warrants in California, which dated back to '90 and '94, 
this was continued. Those were all cleared. He came back 
up here. The reason he is in California, and I know that 
the media was concerned about that, is Alfred is 
realistic. While I am asking for two years on probation 
and then probation, even at that he cannot provide for his 
family. He got out on bond and stayed in jail for quite a 
period of time. He got out on a property bond and he has 
been working and putting money away, and he moved his 
family, his three children and his common-law wife down to 
California to live with his mother, to be where they can 
be supported and cared for, knowing that that means, for 
whatever period of incarceration he must go through, there 
will be no contact from them. As a matter of fact, he 
said, "I don't want my children to see me in prison 
because it is more important what happens with them than 
what happens with me." 
I think that shows the kind of person that Alfred 
is. I think it shows what he has done. This event has 
been a life-changing experience for him, as it has been 
for everyone in the audience here today. A tremendous 
loss. A loss of his physical work. He will be able to 
work but not at the level he once was. A loss of family 
7 
and friends. A loss of a sense of peace. He will never 
be able to live this down. Ever. And in all of our 
conversations he has talked about that. 
We ask to do medication in this case and I 
don't think the families are quite ready for it, as much 
for Alfred as for them, to tell them how he feels. He 
wants the families to know that even if he goes to prison, 
that offer is always available. In mediation they can 
yell at him. They can talk to him. They can do whatever 
they want. They have a social worker sitting there that 
is working with the victim. It can be a tremendous outlet 
and actually I thought it would help Alfred because he 
can't forgive himself. He is having a very hard time with 
that. I have never worked with a client with a greater 
remorse for greater understanding in the situation. 
We would ask the court to have a restitution 
hearing in this matter. There is a lot still out there 
and he is not going to have representation. If the court 
decides to send him to prison, he will not have 
representation before the Board of Pardons. 
Alfred --a lot of people would say, "That is a 
lot of money. I'll never pay it." Alfred's comments 
throughout have always been -- There is an insurer in this 
case. There is a debate as to whether the vehicle is 
still insured. Whether it was in fact lapsed or just at 
8 
that midway period. That is why they filed suit against 
Alfred. 
So there are some issues that I would ask that we 
present to this court. I believe we probably can work it 
out with Mr. Lemcke but should the court decide prison is 
appropriate in this case, I would not want him to go to 
prison with an open ended figure. I don't think that 
would be fair to anyone. We would like to at least have 
some resolution so we would ask this court. 
Finally, I have probably the biggest request in 
this case. Of all the things I have seen, Alfred is 
probably one of the best father's I have ever known. He 
is very concerned and I think that is where his remorse 
and his understanding and empathy for the victims come 
from because he is such a good family person. He loves 
his kids. His wife is due on April 13th. She typically 
have her babies two weeks early. I would ask the court to 
consider setting this sentence over until she has the baby 
and have him respond. 
THE COURT: You mean August instead of April? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: August, I am sorry. August 
the 13th. We know that all the other victims are not 
going to see their children. They are not going to see 
these events. We know that and we empathize with that, 
but we would ask the court to consider, in light of the 
9 
fact this case is not a case of malice. It is a case of 
irresponsibility. A case of numerous factors coming 
together all at once. Not all in Aisea's control. Not 
all in Alfred's control. Granted, Alfred had the 
principal control here, but the catastrophic nature of 
this event came from many, many factors coming together, 
and we would ask the court to consider that. 
Should he go to prison, the Board of Pardons 
would have ample time to work with him, even if they make 
him serve most of the sentence, four and a half years, 
they would still be able to keep him on parole after that 
for a considerable period of time. It would put him in a 
position to be paying money back more quickly and that is 
important for some of these people. A lot of the victims 
didn't respond and I don't know why that is, but those are 
the very victims that I think. And some of them are truly 
sympathetic with Mr. Gotay (phonetic) and he has made his 
peace one-on-one with them. But these people still need 
money. 
Alfred is capable of making money. He is good 
at making a lot of money and putting it away to try and 
take care of his family right now. I know the rest of the 
families need some care. 
We would ask that you at least sentence this 
concurrently. That we give the Board plenty of time to 
- 10 
work with this and punishment in light of the facts. That 
is the State's recommendation as a concurrent. I think 
the State and myself more than anyone and Mr. Allen have 
delved into this case knowing the nuances of the case, 
know the facts of this case. There is a lot going on. 
That is not to minimize Alfred's control. There is a lot 
going on. 
Alfred would like to address the court and the 
victims. Would you want him to do that now or after 
hearing from the State? 
THE COURT: Now is fine. 
MR. KATOA: This is a harder time for me. I am 
happy that I got this opportunity to say these things. To 
the families that were involved, to everyone that had me 
come up with them because of the situation, I know that 
sorry is inadequate. (Unintelligible) hours back. 
I know that sorry is just so inadequate. I 
know each and every one of you, if I could I would replace 
their lives with mine. I don't want you to think that I 
did this not caring, not thinking maybe, but absolutely 
not caring. 
If I knew the outcome of that day, I would have 
never acted in that way as I did. I just want to say I am 
sorry to each and every one of you that have lost. 
I can tell you, I would like for mediation. 
11 
That would be easier for me if I did this, hear from you, 
and let you vent your frustrations towards me. Again, I 
am sorry. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lemcke, did you want to argue now 
or let Mr. Allen go first? 
MR. LEMCKE: I will let Mr. Allen go first, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Allen. 
MR. ALLEN: Uh, I would echo many of the things 
that Ms. Kreeck Mendez said with regard to the recommended 
matrix and with regard to willingness to have a mediation 
to discuss things and also with regard to the restitution 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Mr. Akauloa's record is significantly 
worse than Mr. Katoa's. Mr. Akauloa had a very similar 
incident within just a couple of years of this incident. 
He also had a much higher blood alcohol level than Mr. 
Katoa. Frankly, I see them in a little different light. 
You might want to address those things. 
MR. ALLEN: Well, uh, it is hard to respond. You 
are right that there are those prior things there and 
those reflect poorly on Aisea. All I can offer is that, 
uh, apparently he didn't learn his lesson and he 
understands that that means that he may have a stiffer 
punishment. He is very sorry. He accepts responsibility 
12 
for this. He wishes he could do something to right the 
wrong. 
He has tried to cooperate from the beginning. 
He gave a full statement to the detective immediately 
following, without an attorney. He pleaded guilty at 
another stage to the counts to which he has pleaded 
guilty, and with the recommendation of the concurrent 
sentences from the prosecution. 
He did undergo a treatment course on his own 
for alcohol earlier this year. Of course, none of this 
makes amends for what happened. 
I would offer to the court that Aisea is young. 
And the other comment that I have is that he is married to 
his wife Josephine who is here today and that they are, I 
mentioned this in my witness statement, they are expecting 
a little boy and I would ask the court to consider the 
impact of added years of separation on that child. 
Aisea wants to address the court and the 
victims. Just in conclusion, he is extremely sorry for 
what happened and is prepared to receive his judgment. 
THE COURT: Okay. You want to go ahead, 
Mr. Akauloa. 
MR. AKAULOA: First of all, to the families of 
Robert and Helene Sherlin, Amanki Moala, Selanito Sitani, 
and Sione Pilivi, I truly am sorry. I accept full 
13 
responsibility for the things I have done that has caused 
this great tragedy. I know apologies can't bring nothing 
back. But as I am standing here, not a day goes by that I 
don't think about the victims. 
My thoughts are earlier, if I could have gave 
my life for all of them to live, I would in a heart beat, 
the job that I have. I truly am sorry. If not today, 
sometime if you find in your heart to forgive me, I would 
like the mediation hearings where we can vent our 
frustrations. 
Secondly, I would like to apologize to my 
family. Also thank them for standing by me at this time. 
That is it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lemcke. 
MR. LEMCKE: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor 
there are, I have been informed, three members of the 
Sherlin family who asked to address the court. Is the 
court inclined to hear them? 
THE COURT: Certainly. If you folks would like 
to stand up and --
MR. LEMCKE: Go up to the podium if you would and 
identify yourself by name for the record and your 
relationship to the victims in this case. 
THE COURT: I want to tell you folks, I have read 
all of the letters that were submitted to me and there 
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were many that were very positive about your parents. I 
have also viewed the video which you prepared. 
VOICE: My name is Robert Sherlin. I am the 
oldest son of Robert and Helene Sherlin. I would like to 
share with you, some of this would be redundant from the 
letters, but I would like the defendants to hear it as 
well. I will try not to take too much time in my 
comments. 
The day the accident took place, the day my 
mother was killed, was my wife and I's 15th wedding 
anniversary, which has stolen the joy from that day away 
from us forever. Mom died at the accident scene; dad died 
a week later. We stayed beside him. He never woke from 
his coma. After discussing the matter with the ICU 
physician, the surviving children made a decision to turn 
dad's life support off. We were with him as he expired. 
At least we got to tell him good-bye and to hold him. 
That was not a possibility with my mother. Her injuries 
were too severe to allow us to ever see her again. The 
last time I ever saw her was at the Salt Lake airport as 
we were leaving from Christmas to return to our home in 
Houston. Hugging and waving good-bye, if I had only known 
what was going to happen, I would have stayed longer. 
Bob and Helene are gone because of these men's 
criminal acts. What happened was in no way an accident. 
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I have heard it characterized that way. What they did is 
the equivalent of firing a loaded gun haphazardly into a 
crowd. Does the fact that the gunman did not take actual 
aim, wasn't his responsibilities for his actions? No, the 
death of my parents was not an accident. Both of these 
men behaved in an extremely reckless and deadly fashion. 
Either one of them could have backed down and behaved in a 
rationale and civilized fashion. Neither did. 
I submit that the (inaudible) accident which 
could have resulted from their behalf was if they 
accidentally had not killed someone. These individuals 
you have no place in society. They took the lives of my 
parents and through others. I understand that they have a 
arrests in the past. That was brought up. Sadly for my 
mom and dad, it appears no lessons were learned from their 
past mistakes. I am concerned that none will be learned 
this time. 
They have failed to accept the most fundamental 
responsibilities that our society requests of its members. 
They were racing at high speeds down residential streets, 
they drove recklessly down the wrong side of these 
streets, they climbed behind the wheel while drunk, 
neither owned the car they were driving, neither had auto 
insurance. My family, my parents' estate is now under 
attack by insurance companies trying to recoup monies lost 
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from this accident. Money means nothing to us. 
I don't want these people's money. 
Based on all of this, I would request that the 
two defendants receive the maximum penalty possible under 
law. This will not serve to punish them for what they 
have done. It will serve to punish them but it also 
protects society for the brief period they will be away. 
I realize the punishment of these men will not bring my 
parents back, however, their sentencing will serve an 
important step toward my family's closure to this whole 
tragedy. 
I also have a letter here from my 13-year-old 
daughter expressing her loss at these men's, but you have 
received that letter from them. I prefer to just read 
just the very first paragraph for the defendants, if that 
is okay with you, Your Honor. I don't want to take too 
much time here. 
This is the words of my 13-year-old daughter 
(inaudible): "I have been through many things since 
July 4, 1997. I celebrated my grandma's birthday without 
her. I celebrated Thanksgiving without my grandparents. 
I tried to have a mere Christmas without them. I turned 
13 without my grandmother to talk to. I celebrated a new 
year. I went to my first dance. 
I have been through many other painful 
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occurrences since July 4th. My grandmother died. My 
grandfather was in a coma for six days; he died. I went 
to my first two funerals, within a week of each other. 
They are people I deeply loved. I have gone through this 
due to the actions of two people. They killed my grandma 
and my grandpa and part of my life." 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sherlin. 
VOICE: My name is Carol Hillard. I am Helene 
and Robert's daughter. It is impossible to describe to 
you the impact that their death has had on me and my 
family in the last year. You would have to see the anger 
in the book each day when we get mad at each other for 
every little thing. We have to continue to remind 
ourselves it is not our fault that this happened. Someone 
else killed them. You would have to feel the physical 
pain and heaviness on my chest to realize they are really 
gone and I will never be able to talk to them, laugh with, 
look to them for advise, understanding and support. 
I will never be able to touch or hug them again. And that 
pain I cannot describe to you. 
You would have to be there in the middle of the 
night when I lay in bed and cry for all the things about 
them I miss so desperately and the emptiness that I feel. 
It is unbearable. You would have to be there when I have 
nightmares of the accident and relive every moment from 
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the time my brother called me to each of my parent's 
funerals. It is a nightmare that will never go away and 
will be with me for the rest of my life. You would have 
to be there to see the look in my son's eyes when we talk 
about grandma and grandpa and all the special things that 
they did together; all the things that they shared. He 
was robbed of these two wonderful people being part of his 
life, to share in his achievements and to support him in 
his failures. It has left a huge whole in his young life 
and it is hard to explain to him why this had to happen. 
It didn't have to happen. 
Either of these people could have stopped this 
accident at any time. Both of them were barely at the 
legal limit of alcohol. They had more control than they 
cared to admit. These two people that killed my parents 
have continued to be in trouble with the law even after 
the accident. You would think that in some way they would 
try to give something back to society after the horrible 
devastation that they caused. They have not chosen to do 
so. They say "actions speak louder than words,11 and I see 
no indication of good intent. I can't help but be made to 
think that if they had to take responsibility for crimes 
and not passed, my parents and the other three victims 
would still be alive. 
I ask you to give these people the maximum 10 
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years in prison, to make them really think their path in 
life. To keep them out of society and insure that no one 
else has to go through what the nightmare my family has 
had to go through, and the families of the other victims. 
I just no, Your Honor, if there is any question about the 
speed, just seeing the accident and the destruction on the 
car, there should be no question as to how fast these 
people were going. They know how important it is being 
parents and why are my parents were such a huge part of my 
life and I am sorry it doesn't take that back. Thank you. 
VOICE: (William Sherlin) I am the William 
Sherlin man. I am the youngest child of Robert and 
Helene and at 33 when they died, they were not only my 
parents, they were people I knew. They were good people. 
They were as law abiding as you could ever want people to 
be. And I know that these men will lives with their 
deaths, But at least they will live. Giving them the 
maximum that they have bargained for isn't nearly enough. 
There was a mistake that was not intent but the result is 
still the same and we still don't have our parents, our 
friends and the friends of many people in this courtroom. 
And I just ask that this is not the time to slap them on 
the wrist, not the time to give them a warning, and not 
the time to say that "I hope you have learned from this." 
This is a time to give them the maximum and I hope you 
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feel that way too. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lemcke, were there 
any other victims that wish to speak. 
MR. LEMCKE: (inaudible) Let me ask, are there 
any representatives of the family Sione Pilivi that would 
like to speak? (Pause) Are there any representatives of 
the family of Selanito Sitani who would like to speak. 
(Pause) Are there any representatives of the family of 
Amanki Moala who would like to speak. (Pause) 
Your Honor, a couple of mechanical matters 
first. One, on the restitution, counsel is correct that 
they are entitled to a restitution hearing. I don't 
believe that in terms of the equities and the subrogations 
of the various insurers that are involved, that would be 
before us at a restitution hearing. I think that the 
absolute amount of damage would be; but in terms of 
whether or not one of the cars was in lapse or insured, 
that is not for us. That is for a different forum to 
examine. 
Counsels do correctly state our recommendations 
in this case. 
When you have three major factors that a 
prosecutor will argue* to a judge in terms of sentence, one 
of them is past record, one of them is quality of conduct, 
and one is the extent of the damage done. And in this 
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case even had there been no past record, even had the 
quality of the conduct been almost benign, nonetheless the 
third factor, the amount of damage done, there were five 
people killed here. There was Helene Sherlin was killed 
here. Robert Sherlin was killed here. Sione Pilivi was 
killed here. Selanito Sitani was killed here, and Amanki 
Moala was killed here, a year this coming Friday on our 
State Holiday. The extent of the damage done makes this a 
present case. 
The question I believe is before Your Honor is 
the question of consecutive vs. concurrent. As you 
stated, the records are not equal here of the two 
defendants, and further, although it may seem that it is 
punishing to Mr. Katoa, his wife, perhaps more so than to 
him, I would ask the court to go ahead and sentence today, 
get the sentences started today, simply because this case 
needs some finality. 
THE COURT: Ms. Kreeck Mendez, Mr. Allen, any 
final words? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, I would just like 
to clarify, and in all honesty it is more for it is going 
to be in the newspaper tomorrow, than anything else. 
There has been no continuing criminal. Alfred moved his 
family to California. He was riding with someone else who 
had a car violation, an equipment violation. As is 
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standard practice, you need a license and information is 
taken on both people and Alfred had old warrants. There 
has been no continuing criminal activity. 
THE COURT: Mr. Akauloa has at least a pending 
charge of activity subsequent to this. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: As to the restitution, I am 
in complete agreement with Mr. Lemcke and I in no way want 
to pull out civil (inaudible). As I told you, there is a 
civil matter pending, but I do want a firm number to go 
forward with whatever happens after this, particularly 
where we are dealing with the Board of Pardons. The Board 
of Pardons, their restitution hearings are much different 
than what is available here. I can work with Mr. Lemcke 
and we can get a firm figure to go forward with. That can 
be handled in whatever situation you place Mr. Katoa in 
today. 
And finally, I know it is hard for the victims 
and Alfred is not really expecting you to give him his 
extra time. Christy would very much like him to be there 
for the birth. He has been there for the birth of each of 
his other three children. And Alfred said he would just 
ask. So it is not that he expects it. He knows it is 
huge. 
THE COURT: You have asked. Mr. Allen. 
MR. ALLEN: The expected date, as I say, is quite 
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a ways off. So we haven't asked (inaudible) because of 
that. I would just reiterate what I said before. 
THE COURT: Well, this is a difficult case from 
my perspective as I started reviewing it, and I am not 
going to give a lecture today. I don't see any point in 
that. 
It is clear that, particularly Mr. Katoa, is not 
as evil as some of the people I see here in court. 
Mr. Akauloa is worse. There is no question, Mr. Akauloa, 
your record shows much more serious criminal activity in 
the past and also this other incident where you were lucky 
you didn't kill anybody, just a couple of years before 
this one. But you both have serious records. You both 
have had the kind of prior conduct and the kind of 
consequences of that conduct that should have taught you 
better. Again Mr. Akauloa, more so than Mr. Katoa. 
Since this incident, you both have behaved 
responsibly and appropriately and I am going to give you 
credit for that. I think I am hearing very sincere 
remorse. It is too late but it is obviously sincere and 
you obviously care deeply. 
Mr. Lemcke mentioned the three areas that 
compare. Starting with the worst one, no matter what your 
daily lives are like and your families are like, you have 
caused incredible damage. You have caused incredible 
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damage as a direct result of your almost absolute and 
total disregard for the lives and the safety of other 
people. Terrible damage. You both had been drinking. 
You both had been smoking marijuana. You both had been 
arrested, convicted and sentenced for drinking crimes and 
drug crimes. 
I do see a difference in prior record and 
conduct. I see Mr. Akauloa as more culpable but not 
sufficiently more culpable to get a different sentence. 
I am going to sentence you each to zero to 5 
years on each of the two counts you pled guilty to and I 
am going to send you to prison on each sentence 
consecutive to the other sentences. It will be up to the 
Board of Pardons to determine when you are out. 
This order is also going to include a full 
restitution order and I am going to leave that issue open 
for a period of 12 months and I am going to award a 
$500.00 recoupment fee on each case. That is to pay for 
the services of your attorneys. They will be forthwith 
sentences. You will both go in today. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALFRED P. KATOA, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION 
TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 971016306FS 
JUDGE HENRIOD 
Defendant, ALFRED P. KATOA, by and through his counsel of record, DEBORAH KREECK 
MENDEZ and RONALD S. FUJINO of Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, moves this court to 
correct the illegal sentence, or in the alternative, moves that this court amend the judgment entered 
on the aforementioned case. 
On July 20 , 1998, Mr. Katoa was sentenced by this Court to two consecutive terms of 0-5 
years in the Utah State Prison for automobile homicide. Mr. Katoa requests this Court reconsider 
this judgment and commitment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) , allowing he 
Court to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. In the alternative Mr. 
Katoa argues that this matter may be addressed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).' 
This Court entered consecutive sentences on the basis of the loss of life and injuries incurred 
'Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81 (e) allows application of Civil rules in criminal matters when no 
controlling criminal rule exists. 
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through Mr. Katoa and Mr. Akauola's actions. Utah law requires that in issuing a consecutive 
sentence the Court must consider the gravity and circumstances of the offense and the history, 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401 (3) . 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated that Utah Law favors concurrent sentencing. State v. 
Galii, slip op. filed June 16, 1998. The court in Galli emphasized the 2-part consideration in 
determining whether sentences should run consecutively or concurrently: the gravity and 
circumstances of the offense and factors regarding the defendant. The court in Galli noted that the 
Galli case had mitigating factors that the trial court did not adequately consider. 
As in Galli, the offenses in this matter are very serious. However, unlike Gain's 3-first degree 
felonies, Mr. Katoa is convicted of 2 third degree felonies. Further, while Mr. Katoa's conduct was 
negligent and criminal, it was not a knowing or intentional crime, it was not a crime for personal gain 
and was not a crime of malice. Mr. Katoa does not contest that the losses in this matter are 
immense, only that mitigating factors require a concurrent sentence. Like Mr. Galli, Mr. Katoa 
voluntarily confessed and accepted responsibility from the earliest point when he was interviewed by 
police in the hospital. He admitted more use of alcohol and marijuana than toxicology reports 
documented. 
Further, Mr. Katoa's prior record included only prior misdemeanors. Perhaps the most 
compelling evidence in favor of concurrent sentencing is Mr. Katoa's acceptance of responsibility and 
mature manner of preparing for resolution of this matter. Mr. Katoa spent quality time with his 
family, was employed in a hard labor position, in spite of his physical impairment and pain from the 
accident, and most self sacrificing, moved his family to California where they will have emotional and 
financial support. He voluntarily returned to Court with his wife and family to accept responsibility, 
and had tremendous remorse and concern for the families of those who died and were injured. He 
apologized to those who wished to speak to him even before pleading guilty. This man has been 
extremely productive since this tragic event while recovering from serious and permanent injuries. 
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It is clear that Mr. Katoa is capable of complete rehabilitation. Mr. Katoa's behavior in the 
past year demonstrates that he is willing and has, in fact, made dramatic changes in his life. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Katoa respectfully requests that the Court alter or amend its 
judgment and commitment to provide for concurrent sentences. 
DATED this h? day of July, 1998. 
J WU~ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorneys Office, 231 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ,^fdav of July, 1998. 
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